# Is epistemic opacity really a problem?

Opacity, most often without reference to its epistemic epithet, has a long history as a foundational problem for sceptical worries about algorithmically delivered results. Opacity is one of Moor's invisibilities which supposedly connects computer science to ethics in an essential way, it has been offered by Humphreys to lend credibility to the then new field of philosophy computer simulations and it is now haunting machine learning and explainable AI methods. Remarkably the discussion in ML and XAI often assumes that these methods firstly are in fact opaque and secondly that this is a problem. Though already the first assumption depends crucially on the definition of opacity, which is seldomly engaged with, this essay will deal with the second claim. Is opacity a problem and if yes which solutions can we expect? To this end previous solutions to perceived opacity problems of computational methods will be studied. The goal is to infer a robust notion of solution for opaque problems and elucidate its connection to mere habituation to opacity. It remains to be seen if this notion can be carried over to ML contexts or if we need to stop worrying and learn to love opacity.